

Relation to old BNSP

new BNSP drafted by State:

a) ILL determine new plan

b) Get into clear-cut, comprehensive (agreement of effort, current plans)

c) On its points in old BNSP, some in JSOP, JSCP

d) On its points in others, December, SIOP

e) On its new points in JSCP, JSOP.

JSCP, JSOP must be submitted for review & revised by
Sec Def.

a) Review JCS interpretation of guidance, roles, tasks

b) Review JCS conformity to guidance in BNSP

c) Review disagreements, conflicts, gaps, vaguenesses.

And the

Depts of GW, LW?

Role of President, SecDef? (w. JCS)

8

Compatible with options, but no mention: Army C
following initial exchange
Ops, conducted by JCS?

No mention of established national command units.

LW undertakings: act swiftly + effectively to defeat or suppress
aggression, applying force in a manner and on a scale

best calculated to attain US objectives while avoiding the

use of tactical nuclear weapons if possible and while
minimizing the danger of hostilities broadening into
general war.

Vietnam, Thailand?

1967-1969 (-67) begins 1 July 66

"all-out general war"

GW could be initiated as the result of miscalculation,

escalation of a local situation, or less likely, the

commitment on part of SU that attack by the US is

Relation to old BNSP

new BNSP drafted by State:

a) Will determine new plan

b) Get not clear-cut, comprehensive (agreement of efforts, current plans)

c) Omit points in old BNSP, now in JSOP, JSOP

d) Omit points in others, December, SIOP

e) Omit new points in JSOP, JSOP.

JSOP, JSOP must be submitted for review & revised by
Sec. Def.

a) Review JSOP interpretation of guidance, roles, tasks

b) Review JSOP conformity to guidance in BNSP

c) Review disagreements, conflicts, gaps, vagueness.

Check the

Depts of GW, LW?

8

Role of President, Sec Def? (w. JCS)

Compatible with options, but no mention: Admex C
following initial exchange
Ops, conducted by JCS?

No mention of centralized national command units.

LW undertakings: act swiftly + effectively to defeat or suppress
aggression, applying force in a manner and on a scale
best calculated to attain US objectives while avoiding the
use of tactical nuclear weapons if possible and while
minimizing the danger of hostilities broadening into
general war.

Vietnam, Thailand?

1967-1969 (-67) begins 1 July 66

12 "all-out general war"

GW could be avoided as the result of miscalculation,

escalation of a local situation, or even likely, the

conviction, on part of SC, that attack by the US is

7 June
1962

... of having the President's advice... in the
NSP on certain aspects of the conduct of hostilities: bear in
mind that all such matters are basically Presidential decisions
and are properly conveyed to the military planners drafting the
NSP and JSCP via the NSP. Last year's experience, suggesting
that all such guidance can come to the planners from the SecDef,
is rather misleading. There was no official NSP approved by
the President. Hence, the current JSCP and JSOP (i.e., the plans
that will go into effect on 1 July) take their guidance from
the (ISA) draft NSP that was circulated to them last spring, and
from the Guidance on SIOP 63: both, in effect, written by SecDef,
in lieu of Presidential guidance.

But if you are going to issue a NSP, that supersedes all
earlier (SecDef) guidance. Omissions or vaguenesses in the NSP
can have a marked--and undesirable--effect on the planners,
particularly those who have chafed at SecDef guidance. Failure
to mention considerations stressed in the Athens speech, other
statements to the JAC, the SIOP guidance, etc.--all of which have
been presented as United States policy (not SecDef policy)--
can only be taken as reflecting a divergence, at least in emphasis,
between the President and the SecDef. This would not go unnoticed
by the planners. And cooperation from the JCS is not going to
be spontaneous and enthusiastic that such doubts would be dispelled.

Page 52: d. In the event of war to conduct operations so as to

minimize damage to the US and its Allies and to bring about a conclusion of hostilities on terms acceptable to the US and its Allies.

If war should occur, it shall be the objective of the United States to conduct hostilities in such a way as to protect rather than injure the interests of the United States and its Allies; to frustrate and defeat opposing military forces and to create the conditions under which the opponents will become reasonable members of the international community. It is in the interest of the United States to achieve its wartime objectives while limiting the destructiveness of warfare, whether it be non-nuclear or nuclear, local or global; in this sense, it is a goal of US policy that any war be a limited war. It is not an objective of the United States to destroy any nation or to maximize the number of people killed in the Communist Bloc in the event of war, no matter what the circumstances of initiation.

Page 52: d. In the event of war to conduct operations so as to minimize damage to the US and its Allies and to bring about a conclusion of hostilities on terms acceptable to the US and its Allies.

((Minimizing damage objective is in present war plans; it is desirable to retain it. It is implicit in US policy as announced in various speeches to SAC, other speeches, par. 11a, 11b, 11c, etc. (I think, it wouldn't make sense to focus on terms ending hostilities as an objective, and ignore the consequences of the cessation of hostilities.))

... 37, ... including ... of ...
... 37, ... including ... of ...

... 37, ... (following sentence was in ...
... except ... to ...; ... agreed ...
... to be ... (b)(1):

✓ The population of our European Alliance is even more exposed.
These facts heighten the requirement for a policy aimed at
limiting civil damage in the event of a major nuclear war; for
generating, so far as possible, adequate non-nuclear defense
alternatives; for maintaining--both to deter attack, to influence
enemy targetting and to conduct operations--strong flexible,
survivable and controlled tactical and strategic nuclear forces;
and for seeking effectively inspected measures of arms control
which would limit mutual powers of destruction while not reducing
the free community's relative capacity to deter or to deal with
Communist attack.

Page 100

a. to ensure maximum deterrence of deliberate aggression, and especially aggression with nuclear weapons;

((Note: you don't deter a "likelihood of aggression"))
to
b. minimize the likelihood of uncalculated, unpremeditated or unintended nuclear conflicts. To reduce the likelihood of accidents, misinterpretation of incidents or intentions, false alarms, or unauthorized actions within any nation (including the United States and its Allies); and to reduce the possibility that such events might trigger major nuclear war.

((This fits well in section on Stability; and your draft as a whole lacks sufficient emphasis on accident, etc., problem as a national security problem.))

c. to deal successfully with aggression short of general war, in a manner which protects the country being defended and preserves ~~its~~ US alliances, which deters further attempts by hostile nations to enhance their influence and strength by armed force, which minimizes the risk of escalation to major nuclear war, and which brings the conflict to a conclusion satisfactory to the US.

((conditions mentioned all span aspects of stability. Also, as stated in your draft, you don't distinguish aggression that starts as general war.))

Page 37. 5. 1. substantially reduce the military capabilities of the army and retain major strategic capabilities--ready, effective and controlled.

((Latter part of sentence was deleted on basis of notion that it was covered elsewhere: p. 39, llb. But it is very important here; a) You're in bad shape if you merely reduce enemy capabilities by expending all your ready force in initial attacks, leaving the enemy with residual force and yourself with none; b) later passage doesn't stress capability, as this passage does: it deals with employment.))

Page 38. line 13: ...high level decisions. ^{Survivable} survivable command, communications and information reporting systems should be developed...

~~XX~~

~~XX~~

6.29: I can give you important, current details of such efforts!

retaining ready, survivable strategic forces under centralized control, for possible selective use against enemy urban-industrial centers; against other major elements of enemy strength; and to contribute in other ways to a below;

Page 40.

Add subparagraph xm at end of section 11 (i.e., after subparagraph c):

In a wide variety of circumstances of general war, US counter-military action could reduce enemy capability to inflict further damage or to continue the war; while the survival of controlled US ready residual forces threatening, by their very existence, enemy targets surviving or deliberately preserved as hostages in initial exchanges, may destroy ~~have~~ the will of surviving enemy leaders to pursue unrestricted attacks or to continue hostilities. Thus, ^{reserve} US ready forces held in reserve may extend deterrence, in some degree, into the wartime period; and the prospect of confronting such reserve forces after any attack gives any potential enemy powerful incentives to refrain from planning ^(unlimited) unrestricted attacks on US or Allied civil society under any circumstances. ~~Such forces are not to be used in any way that would result in the United States being confronted by a disarmed opponent.~~ Furthermore, (a) and (b) together preclude the prospect of a disarmed US confronting an armed opponent; which would be fatal to the goal of ending hostilities on acceptable terms.

...in the point of view of the Soviet Union? US development of weapons mix--e.g., allocation of resources to ICB--the warhead--would be affected by US measures of passive defense, if Soviets wanted primarily to attack US civil population; which, by the way, might not turn out to be irrelevant. But your section ignores the facts: (a) the most significant influence on US casualties in the event of a war is not weapons mix nor--given moderate fallout protection--passive defense, but enemy targeting policy and US countermilitary and coercive strategy; (b) the value of a moderate fallout shelter program rests mainly on the possibility that an enemy will not try, or will be deterred, or will be unable, to launch massive attacks on US population centers.))

Delete third sentence. Substitute: However, while it is not possible to predict confidently the strategy that the Soviet Union would pursue in general war, the survivable nuclear strength of the US ~~and its ability~~ with our evident capability for retaining sizeable strategic forces under flexible, centralized control gives strong incentive to the Soviet Union to plan and execute attacks primarily on military targets rather than population targets in the event of general war, so long as Soviet cities remain as hostages. Even if very substantial exchanges of nuclear weapons were to occur, the damage suffered by the belligerents would vary over wide ranges, depending upon the targets that were hit. If both sides were so confine their attacks to important military targets, damage, while high, would nevertheless be significantly less than if urban-industrial targets were also attacked.

The purpose of this document is to provide a guide to the
use of the word "passive" particularly in the context of
the word "passive" as used in military contexts so that the primary
danger to most civilians is from fallout. [In the light of the
various circumstances under which hostilities might be conducted,
passive defense has three main purposes:

a. To prevent or limit avoidable fatalities or casualties
from nuclear conflict not involving massive attack directly
upon US major population centers. This purpose...

((whether war starts accidentally, by miscalculation or
premeditation is relatively unimportant: the issue is whether
or not enemy has planned to maximize US population loss, and whether
he is able to carry out such plans)).

US general purpose forces should be strong enough in combination with available Allied forces (i) to frustrate, without using nuclear weapons, major non-nuclear assault by Sino-Soviet forces against areas where vital US interests are involved; at a minimum, to contain such major assault long enough to give the Communists full opportunity to appreciate the risks of the course on which they were embarked and to afford diplomacy adequate opportunity to end the conflict.

US general purpose forces should also be strong enough in combination with Allied forces (ii) to frustrate indefinitely, in sustained combat without using nuclear weapons, non-nuclear aggression at any level less than major assault by Soviet or Chinese Communist ground and air forces; (iii) to contribute to general war missions in the event of all-out Sino-Soviet attack, so long as this does not significantly interfere with or detract from their primary missions which are to deter and deal with conflicts less than general war.

* in case of

1. The United States will continue to support their
independent and non-aligned states missions (U.S. (1)) and
the described above.

a. unchanged

2. A longer term, but clearly desirable, objective of US policy
would be to create US general purpose forces sufficiently
substantial so that, in conjunction with correspondingly enhanced
allied forces, they could frustrate major Sino-Soviet non-nuclear
assault by non-nuclear means, in sustained combat without prescribed
time limit. Prompt consideration...studied intensively.

Page 49:

delete first paragraph (Or: The requirements and relative costs
of achieving this objective in different regions should also
be studied, and the possibility examined that in some regions
the threat of US initial use of strategic nuclear weapons would
remain essential to deterring attack, even after a large increase
in free world non-nuclear strength.)

17. Non-nuclear Contingency Planning. Within the limits
set forth in paragraph 16, excluding the last subparagraph,
contingency plans...plans.

a. 50: add:

18. Conduct military operations in a manner which
enhance Allied solidarity and effectiveness; and which also
prevent aggressors from resorting to the threat or use of armed
force.

((Paragraph c. seems to me to contain a non sequitur. Why does a secular increase in the ability of the US and the SU to inflict damage on each other "lead to a situation in which continuing substantial expenditure of resources and scarce talent is needed to maintain a stable military environment"? Regarding if the US and SU both acted sensibly in designing the force posture embodying this capability, stability could be achieved, surely, without maintaining indefinitely current levels of expenditure on strategic systems. It would almost seem more appropriate for the last sentence in the paragraph to read: "Nevertheless, the situation is likely to persist in which continuing substantial expenditure..."--if you believe this.))

✓ a. A persuasive second-strike deterrent can be maintained at lower levels of US nuclear delivery capabilities than at present, without necessarily jeopardizing US ability to limit damage or to achieve other wartime objectives if deterrence should fail, if we are assured that our own reductions in capabilities are matched appropriately by the USSR.

((The functions of strategic forces are not limited to deterring, retaliating all-out, or striking first; the goal of preserving US and Allied societies if deterrence fails must also be considered. But this latter goal, too, may be attainable at lower levels of US strategic force than at present if Soviet forces are modified or reduced: not necessarily by symmetric or "one-for-one" reduction.))

32. The possibility of uncalculated, unpremeditated or unreasoned nuclear conflicts, resulting from accident, misinterpretation of incidents or intentions, false alarms or unauthorized actions is large enough to be an important reason for seeking remedial measures.

((What is meant in your text by "failure of communication"? What mechanism do you have in mind? Failure of communication leading to unauthorized action by a subordinate; or misinterpretation of intentions; or failure to prevent a war arising from one of above causes because of communication failure? These questions also arise with this phrase in heading to paragraph 32, and line 1, p. 65. Phrase should be explained or deleted.))

Page 154r 157:

general nuclear war. Contingency plans should be prepared providing for varying levels of active ~~superior~~ intervention.

((Current and past JSCF's call for such plans to be prepared by CINCEUR; general tone of your passage would suggest that he should not make such plans, if you omitted any mention of planning.))

...in the interim, the JCS have already commented that the phrase "and then..." (line 8, p. 46) suggests unnecessarily that the time for Communist appreciation of risk and the time for direct diplomatic intervention must be cumulative, rather than possibly concurrent; I would agree that "then" might be deleted. Furthermore, your renumbering of goals, leaving the first paragraph on p. 46 without a number, makes it difficult to allude to that paragraph when you want to, on p. 48, line 13 (where you refer to (b), apparently by mistake).

Whoever inserted the words "non-nuclear" in line 4, p. 48, (they appear in the May 7 draft, but not the earlier, March 26 draft) created a rather wry effect. To say that troops should be capable of fully discharging their non-nuclear combat missions (presumably, specified earlier) seems surely to imply, without the need for saying it, that they should not be dependent on nuclear weapons in doing so (i.e., "for their full effectiveness in sustained non-nuclear combat"). I am deleting clause starting with "and," assuming that "non-nuclear combat missions" have been defined.

In the third paragraph on p. 48 you start to use your distinctions, but new questions are raised. "Creates US general purpose forces sufficiently substantial so that they could... in conjunction with available allied forces... for non-nuclear wars, major non-nuclear result." What words of

... on page 57-58. (All have been ...)

pages 44, 45 and 46 may lead to confusion. You have simplified
Kissinger's suggested sentence by changing the semicolon after
"involved" on line 4, p. 46, to a period. But now the first
sentence simply asserts flatly that general purpose forces should
be strong enough to frustrate, without using nuclear weapons,
major non-nuclear assault, without any stated time limit; just as
the first sentence of the next paragraph states that they should
be strong enough to frustrate non-nuclear aggression less than
major assault. (This may seem picayune, since the next sentence
of the first paragraph does mention a maximum time limit; but
(a) the JCS are pretty picayune when they read these things, and
(b) the whole point of this passage is to make some subtle--perhaps
over-subtle--distinctions).

In the second sentence, does "allied" include both the US
and its Allies? The sentence seems to focus on non-US allied
strength: now that you have made it a separate sentence from the
first, which deals with "US general purposes forces."

The phrase "stated time limit" (line 7, p. 46) or "time
limit" (line 13, p. 46) gives a misleading impression of the
precision with which you have stated your operational objective.
The interval involved certainly cannot be specified in advance,
and would be determined somewhat arbitrarily in a specific case.
What length of time, in a specific case, would be "long enough
to give the Communists a 'full' opportunity to 'appreciate' the
situation and then to reflect on having an 'adequate' opportunity."
You have scarcely "stated" a "time limit" here; to pretend that

...as has been pointed out, already included in the first paragraph, p. 49, that you can do this already anywhere (wherever), since you refer to special circumstances "where allied strength is not sufficient..." Are you saying now you would like to be able to do this everywhere, under all circumstances? But the first paragraph on p. 49 states that you cannot aspire to that goal. Do you mean you want to be able to do it someplace where you cannot now, but where it would be feasible? Where?

In conjunction with allied forces that are "available" now, or that could be available? (In Europe, we are stressing a buildup of non-US general purpose forces to this end, are we not?)

What would "steps additional to those called for under (a)--(c) above" look like? Why not mention the possible buildup of allied forces as well as US general purpose forces? (You mention "resources available to the US and its allies" in connection with this objective: which is stated only in terms of US general purpose forces.)

The first paragraph on p. 49: what is it, in fact, that US and allied forces cannot frustrate major non-nuclear assault even with large increases in non-nuclear strength without local use of nuclear weapons? Perhaps this should be obvious to me, but it isn't; it wouldn't hurt to be more specific. (places, if they exist,) Are there regions in which it is likely that the opponent would be able to respond in kind to tactical nuclear weapons? If not, the threat of strategic nuclear weapons would not be "essential to deterring attack." Even if they could respond, the threat of tactical nuclears and ALL other steps (though formidable) than if they could not

1
[redacted]
second; it might still be more credible than the threat to use strategic weapons, and perhaps as effective), so the threat to initiate strategic attack would still not be "essential." Is it necessary, or wise, to imply that we cannot escape from the necessity to threaten initial use of strategic nuclear weapons even if we accept the political costs of a "large increase in non-nuclear strength"? (Did you really mean to say something about the present situation, prior to any large increase in forces?) I would delete this paragraph.

Back on p. 46: the JCS suggest deletion of the footnote; I agree, unless you wish to be more specific as to what you have in mind. The notion of "time periods required" which "vary according to the area" suggests implausible precision, and it is not obvious what factors underlying this variation you might be suggesting.

Paragraph 17, p. 49: Your only paragraph labelled "Contingency Planning" under section B-F, "General Purpose Forces," deals exclusively with non-nuclear responses. You never mention plans in connection with tactical nuclear weapons (paragraph 19). Perhaps there should be a subparagraph (d) under 19, on such plans; but then paragraph 17 should be more specific than "Contingency Planning": e.g., "Non-nuclear Contingency Planning."

a. to achieve maximum deterrence of deliberate aggression, and especially aggression with nuclear weapons;

((Note: you don't deter a "likelihood of aggression"))

b. to minimize the likelihood of uncalculated, unpremeditated or unintended nuclear conflicts. To reduce the likelihood of accidents, misinterpretation of incidents or intentions, false alarms, or unauthorized actions within any nation (including the United States and its Allies); and to reduce the possibility that such events might trigger major nuclear war.

((This fits well in section on Stability; and your draft as a whole lacks sufficient emphasis on accident, etc., problem as a national security problem.))

c. to deal successfully with aggression short of general war, in a manner which protects the country being defended and preserves ~~its~~ US alliances, which deters further attempts by hostile nations to enhance their influence and strength by armed force, which minimizes the risk of escalation to major nuclear war, and which brings the conflict to a conclusion satisfactory to the US.

((conditions mentioned all such aspects of stability. Also, as stated in your draft, you can't distinguish aggression that is as general war.))

Page 37. 5. ...substantially reduce the military capabilities of the enemy and retain major strategic capabilities--ready, effective and controlled.

((Latter part of sentence was deleted on basis of notion that it was covered elsewhere: p. 59, llb. But it is very important here; a) You're in bad shape if you merely reduce enemy capabilities by expanding all your ready force in initial attacks, leaving the enemy with residual force and yourself with none; b) later passage doesn't stress capability, as this passage does; it deals with employment.))

Page 35. line 13: ...high level decisions. ^{Highly}Survivable command, communications and information reporting systems should be developed...

xxxxxx

6.37. I can give you information, current and secret information!

can centralized control, for possible selective use against urban-industrial centers; and other major elements of enemy strength; and to contribute in other ways to a holocaust.

Page 40.

Add subparagraph (a) at end of section 11 (i.e., after subparagraph c):

In a wide variety of circumstances of general war, US countermilitary action could reduce enemy capability to inflict further damage or to continue the war; while the survival of controlled US ready residual forces, threatening, by their very existence, enemy targets surviving or deliberately preserved as hostages in initial exchanges, may destroy even the will of surviving enemy leaders to pursue unrestricted attacks or to continue hostilities. Thus, US ready forces held in reserve may extend deterrence, in some degree, into the wartime period; and the prospect of confronting such reserve forces after any attack gives any potential enemy powerful incentives to refrain from planning, ^(in the future) unrestricted attacks on US or Allied civil society under any circumstances. Furthermore, (a) and (b) together preclude the prospect of an armed US confronting an armed opponent: which would be the goal of any hostilities on non-utile terms.

...the point of view of the Soviet Union, the development of
economic interests, allocation of resources to ICB-...
would be affected by US measures of passive defense, if Soviets
wanted primarily to attack civil population; which, by the way,
might not turn out to be irrelevant. But your section ignores the
facts: (a) the most significant influence on US casualties in the
event of a war is not weapons mix nor--given moderate fallout
protection--passive defense, but enemy targeting policy and US
countermilitary and coercive strategy; (b) the value of a moderate
fallout shelter program rests mainly on the possibility that an
enemy will not try, or will be deterred,
or will be unable, to launch massive attacks
on US population centers.))

Delete third sentence. Substitute: However, while it is not
possible to predict confidently the strategy that the Soviet
Union would pursue in general war, the survivable nuclear strength
of the US ~~ambitions~~ with our evident capability for retaining
sizeable strategic forces under flexible, centralized control gives
strong incentive to the Soviet Union to plan and execute attacks
primarily on military ~~targets~~ rather than population targets in
the event of general war, so long as Soviet cities remain as
hostages. Even if very substantial exchanges of nuclear weapons
were to occur, the damage suffered by the belligerents would vary
widely, ranging, even on the targets that were hit, in
which cities were so small, their attacks to important military
targets, while high-level targets would be disproportionately
damaged if urban-industrial areas were also attacked.

...to most civilians is from fallout. (In the light of the
various circumstances under which hostilities might be conducted,
passive defense has three main purposes:

a. To prevent or limit avoidable fatalities or casualties
from nuclear conflict not involving massive attack directly
upon US major population centers. This purpose...

((whether war starts accidentally, by miscalculation or
premeditation is relatively unimportant: the issue is whether
or not enemy has planned to maximize US population loss, and what
he is able to carry out such plans)).

US general purpose forces should be strong enough in combination with available Allied forces (i) to frustrate, without using nuclear weapons, major non-nuclear assault by Sino-Soviet forces against areas where vital US interests are involved; at a minimum, to contain such major assault long enough to give the Communists full opportunity to appreciate the risks of the course on which they were embarked and to afford diplomacy adequate opportunity to end the conflict.

US general purpose forces should also be strong enough in combination with Allied forces (ii) to frustrate indefinitely, in sustained combat without using nuclear weapons, non-nuclear aggression at any level less than major assault by Soviet or Chinese Communist ground and air forces; (iii) to contribute to general war missions in the event of all-out Sino-Soviet attack, so long as this does not significantly interfere with or detract from their primary missions which are to deter and deal with conflicts less than general war.

* i.e. in case of

...longer term, but clearly desirable, objective to be achieved would be to create US general purpose forces sufficiently substantial so that, in conjunction with correspondingly enhanced allied forces, they could frustrate major Sino-Soviet non-nuclear assault by non-nuclear means, in sustained combat without prescribed time limit. Prompt consideration...studied intensively.

Page 17:

delete first paragraph (On: The requirements and relative costs of achieving this objective in different regions should also be studied, and the possibility examined that in some regions the threat of US initial use of strategic nuclear weapons would remain essential to deterring attack, even after a large increase in free world non-nuclear strength.)

17. Non-nuclear Contingency Planning. Within the limits... set forth in paragraph 16, excluding the last subparagraph, contingency plans...plans.

a. 30: add:

2a. Conduct military operations now in a manner which... Allied solidarity and... which... from reacting to the threat of use of... force.

((Paragraph c. seems to be contain a non sequitur. It says a "secular increase in the ability of the US and the USSR to inflict damage on each other" "lead to a situation in which continuing substantial expenditures of resources and scarce talent is needed to maintain a stable military environment". Expanding if the US and SU both acted sensibly in designing the force posture embodying this capability, stability could be achieved, surely, without maintaining indefinitely current levels of expenditure on strategic systems. It would almost seem more appropriate for the last sentence in the paragraph to read: "Nevertheless, the situation is likely to persist in which continuing substantial expenditure...."--if you believe this.))

✓ a. A persuasive second-strike deterrent can be maintained at lower levels of US nuclear delivery capabilities than at present, without necessarily jeopardizing US ability to limit damage or to achieve other wartime objectives if deterrence should fail, if we are assured that our own reductions in capabilities are matched appropriately by the USSR.

((The functions of strategic forces are not limited to deterring, retaliating all-out, or striking first; the goal of assuring US and Allied societies if deterrence fails must also be considered. But this latter goal, too, may be attainable at lower levels of US strategic force than at present if Soviet forces are limited or reduced, not necessarily by symmetric or "even" reduction.))

...The possibility of unprovoked, unprovoked or unprovoked
conflicts, resulting from accident, misinterpretation of
intentions or intentions, false alarm or unauthorized actions
is large enough to be an important reason for seeking remedial
measures.

((What is meant in your text by "failure of communication"?
What mechanism do you have in mind? Failure of communication
leading to unauthorized action by a subordinate; or misinterpretation
of intention; or failure to prevent a war arising from one of
above causes because of communication failure? These questions
also arise with this phrase in heading to paragraph 32, and
line 1, p. 65. Phrase should be explained or deleted.))

Page 154r 157:

general nuclear war. Contingency plans should be prepared providing
for varying levels of active ~~support~~ intervention.

((Current and past JACF's call for such plans to be prepared
by CINCPAC; general tone of your passage would suggest that he
should not make such plans. If you omitted any mention of planning

request that the timing of the time is not
(which, the JCS is reluctant to force and change the
The JCS have already commented that the phrase "and then"
(p. 45) suggests unnecessarily that the timing for domestic
correlation of risk and the time for direct diplomatic intervention
must be cumulative, rather than possibly concurrent; I would agree
that "then" might be deleted. Furthermore, your renumbering of
pages, leaving the first paragraph on p. 45 without a number, makes
it difficult to allude to that paragraph when you want to, on
p. 48, line 13 (where you refer to (b), apparently by mistake).

Whoever inserted the words "non-nuclear" in line 4, p. 48,
(they appear in the May 7 draft, but not the earlier, March 26
draft) created a rather wry effect. To say that troops should be
capable of fully discharging their non-nuclear combat missions
(presumably, specified earlier) seems surely to imply, without
the need for saying it, that they should not be dependent on
nuclear weapons in doing so (i.e., "for their full effectiveness
in sustained non-nuclear combat"). Please delete clause starting
with "and," assuming that "non-nuclear combat missions" have been
defined.

In the third paragraph, on p. 48 you start to use your
terminology, but new questions are raised. "Greatly US ground
forces currently are committed so that they could
be used, in conjunction with the US Air Force, to
achieve a non-nuclear, or non-nuclear result." What means of

...already failed" in the ...
...p. 49, what you mean is this already ...
...you refer to special circumstances. "where ...
...is not sufficient..." Are you saying now you would like to be
able to do this everywhere, under all circumstances? The first
paragraph on p. 49 states that you cannot aspire to that
goal. Do you mean you want to be able to do it everywhere where
you cannot now, but where it would be feasible? Where?

In conjunction with allied forces that are "available" now, or
that could be available? (In Europe, we are stressing a buildup
of non-US general purpose forces to this end, are we not?)

What would "steps additional to those called for under (a)-(c)
above" look like? Why not mention the possible buildup of Allied
forces as well as US general purpose forces? (You mention "re-
sources available to the US and its allies" in connection with
this objective; which is stated only in terms of US general
purpose forces.)

The first paragraph on p. 49: Where is it, in fact, that US
and allied forces cannot frustrate major non-nuclear assault even
with large increases in non-nuclear strength without local use of
nuclear weapons? Perhaps this should be obvious to me, but it
isn't; it wouldn't hurt to be more specific. Are there regions in
which it is likely that the element would be able to respond in
time to tactical nuclear assault? If not, the threat of strategic
nuclear weapons would not be essential to deterring attack.

What if they could respond to the threat of tactical nuclear ...
...than if they could not

1
[redacted]
...; it might still be that a viable plan the threat to use
strategic weapons, and perhaps as a deterrent, as the threat to
initiate strategic attack would still not be "essential." Is it
necessary, or wise, to imply that we cannot escape from the
necessity to threaten initial use of strategic nuclear weapons even
if we accept the political costs of a "large increase in non-
nuclear strength"? (Did you really mean to say something about
the present situation, prior to any large increase in forces?)
I would delete this paragraph.

Back on p. 46: the JCS suggest deletion of the footnote;
I agree, unless you wish to be more specific as to what you have
in mind. Once again, the phrase "time periods required" which
"vary according to the area" suggests implausible precision, and
it is not obvious what factors underlying this variation you might
be suggesting.

Paragraph 17, p. 49: Your only paragraph labelled "Contingency
Planning" under section A F, "General Purpose Forces," deals
exclusively with non-nuclear responses. You never mention clearly
in connection with tactical nuclear weapons (paragraph 19).
Perhaps there should be a subparagraph (1) under 19, on such
plans; but then paragraph 17 should be more specific than
"Contingency Planning": e.g., "Non-nuclear Contingency Planning."